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RETRIBUTIVE MEDICATION: A DISCUSSION OF A
MAINE LAW ALLOWING INVOLUNTARY,
FORCIBLE MEDICATION OF A PRETRIAL
DEFENDANT FOR THE PURPOSE OF RENDERING
THE DEFENDANT COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL
Ashley T. Perry*
I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2015, prosecutors filed a motion in Kennebec County Superior
Court, Maine, before Justice Donald Marden, to force antipsychotic medication upon
Leroy Smith III, a defendant charged with the gruesome murder of his father. 1 Smith,
who was twenty-four years old at the time of the murder, 2 suffers from delusional
disorder and was declared incompetent to stand trial, 3 after exhibiting “bizarre”
behavior at an initial hearing less than a week after the killing and undergoing a
forensic evaluation.4 However, before that determination, Smith had confessed to
killing his father in their apartment 5 by stabbing him in the head and neck, dragging
his body into the bathtub, cutting it up into small pieces, putting those pieces into
trash bags, and dumping the bags in nearby woods. 6 In Smith’s confession to the
police, Smith said he “filleted” his father and buried him because his father sexually
assaulted him throughout his life. 7
Smith has been held at Riverview Psychiatric Recovery Center in Augusta,
Maine, since the declaration of incompetence. 8 For the first time in a Maine state
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2017. The Author would like to
thank Jamesa Drake, Esq., for her wisdom and guidance during the drafting of this Comment. The Author
is also exceedingly grateful for the endless support of her husband, Jake.
1. Eric Russell, State’s Effort to Force Drug on Defendant Before Trial Sparks Debate, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.pressherald.com/2015/09/20/states-effort-to-force-drug-ondefendant-before-trial-sparks-debate; Betty Adams, Leroy Smith III, Accused of Murder, Hears Lawyers
Debate
Medicating
Him
Involuntarily,
CENTRAL
MAINE
(Dec.
2,
2015),
http://www.centralmaine.com/2015/12/02/leroy-smith-iii-accused-of-murder-hears-lawyers-argue-overinvoluntarily-medicating-him.
2. Betty Adams, Maine Murder Suspect Says He “Filleted” His Father, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (May
8, 2014), http://www.pressherald.com/2014/05/08/gardiner_man_charged_with_killing_father_claims_he_s_
a__political_prisoner.
3. Psychiatric Nurse Practitioner, Miriam Davidson, who has worked with Smith at Riverview Psychiatric
Recovery Center since he arrived in 2014, has diagnosed Smith with delusional disorder but has not ruled out
schizophrenia. Beth Brogan, Defense: Forced Meds Won’t Make Accused Maine Killer Competent for Trial,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Dec. 2, 2015), http://bangordailynews.com/2015/12/02/news/state/defense-forcedmeds-wont-make-accused-maine-killer-competent-for-trial.
4. See Russell, supra note 1.
5. Smith’s confession, as a mentally incompetent defendant, raises several issues regarding the
admissibility of the confession in a court of law under State and Federal Rules of Evidence and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process considerations. However, those specific issues are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
6. See Russell, supra note 1; Adams, supra note 1.
7. Adams, supra note 1.
8. Russell, supra note 1.
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court, prosecutors relied on a new state law which allows involuntary medication of
a defendant who has been declared incompetent for the purpose of restoring
competency to stand trial, provided certain conditions are met. 9 In November 2015,
Justice Marden granted the State’s motion to allow the State access to the Riverview
treatment records of Smith. 10 In January 2016, Justice Marden ordered Smith to be
forcibly medicated to stand trial.11
This Comment does not discuss in depth the details of the case against Smith.
Instead, this Comment explores the underlying issues—involuntary medication and
the fundamental right to be free in the privacy of one’s person, especially for a
presumed-innocent defendant whose case is in pretrial posture—and discusses the
new Maine law which allowed the forcible medication of Smith. Though the law is
constitutional under precedent of the United States Supreme Court, 12 the requisite
conditions are extremely unlikely to be satisfied. The law is also unnecessary in the
State of Maine, when taken into consideration with Maine’s existing policies and
procedures.
Part II of this Comment discusses the provisions of the United States
Constitution that are relevant to this Comment, as well as the provisions of the Maine
State Constitution that are relevant to this Comment. Part III of this Comment
discusses the legislative history of the Maine law at issue, called “An Act Regarding
Treatment of Forensic Patients,” along with the federal background which helps set
the stage for the discussion. Part IV of this Comment discusses the issue of mental
illness in both the federal legal system, and the State of Maine’s legal system. This
includes discussion of the history of mental illness and insanity pleas, and how the
issues have changed over time in the Federal system and in Maine. This section also
includes a description of the process of guardianship and the process of medical
treatment in Maine. Part V of this Comment discusses the morality of forcibly
medicating a pretrial defendant. This includes the deprivation of fundamental rights
and the lack of legitimate penological purpose in forcibly medicating a pretrial
defendant for the sole purpose of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.
Part VI of this Comment discusses the factors created by the United States
Supreme Court in Sell v. United States, which must be present before a defendant
can be forcibly medicated. This part discusses each of the four Sell factors: (1) the
treatment is medically appropriate; (2) the treatment is substantially unlikely to have
side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial; (3) the court has considered
less intrusive alternatives; and, (4) the treatment is necessary to significantly further
important governmental trial-related interests. This part further discusses why each
individual Sell factor is extremely difficult to satisfy.
Finally, Part VII of this Comment concludes that, notwithstanding the fact that
the law is constitutional under United States Supreme Court precedent, the nature of
the requisite conditions and Maine’s existing policies and procedures render the law
9. 15 M.R.S.A. § 106 (2015).
10. Betty Adams, Leroy Smith III, Accused of Killing His Father, to be in Court Dec. 1, CENTRAL
MAINE (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.centralmaine.com/2015/11/02/leroy-smith-iii-accused-of-killing-hisfather-to-be-in-court-dec-1.
11. Sharon Handy, Judge Orders Murder Suspect to be Involuntarily Medicated, WMTW NEWS (Jan. 8,
2016), http://www.wmtw.com/news/judge-orders-murder-suspect-to-be-involuntarily-medicated/37335612.
12. See infra Part VI.
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unnecessary and incompatible with the State of Maine.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION
A. United States Constitution
Several amendments of the United States Constitution are pertinent to the
discussions of this Comment, including the Fourteenth, Sixth, and Fifth
Amendments. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides due process protections for United States citizens. 13 The Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution confers, among other rights, a right for criminal
defendants to be informed of the charge and witnesses against them, as well as
effective assistance of counsel.14 The Fifth Amendment confers a right to be free
from deprivation of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 15
B. Maine State Constitution
To the extent that it tracks the Federal Constitution, there are several
amendments of the Maine State Constitution which are pertinent to the discussions
of this Comment as well. The Constitution of the State of Maine provides protections
to accused persons from deprivation of liberty, except by “judgment of that person’s
peers or the law of the land” 16 and from deprivation of liberty “without due process
of law.”17 Additionally, due process protections of the United States Constitution
are afforded to the citizens of Maine against the actions of the State by the Due

13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
16. ME. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by
the accused and counsel to the accused, or either, at the election of the accused; To demand the nature and
cause of the accusation, and have a copy thereof; To be confronted by the witnesses against the accused;
To have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in favor of the accused; To have a speedy, public
and impartial trial, and, except in trials by martial law or impeachment, by a jury of the vicinity. The
accused shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself or herself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, property or privileges, but by judgment of that person's peers or the law of the land.”).
17. Id. at § 6-A (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of that person's civil rights or
be discriminated against in the exercise thereof.”).
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 18
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Maine Law: “An Act Regarding Treatment of Forensic Patients”
The new Maine law at issue, 15 M.R.S. § 106, along with §§ 107 and 108, was
enacted as part of “An Act Regarding Treatment of Forensic Patients.” An
amendment to the bill, LD 1391, included language about the purpose of the Act
reflecting the need to protect hospital staff and reduce costs based on injuries
sustained by hospital staff.19 The legislative history of the bill reveals that the
original language of the bill read, in part, “the medication . . . [i]s substantially likely
to render the defendant competent to stand trial.”20 The language of the bill changed
from “to stand trial” to “to proceed,”21 with no mention of trial anywhere in the law. 22
Additionally, there was mixed public hearing testimony which the Maine
Legislature received in support or opposition to the bill. Testimony in opposition to
the bill included Oamshri Amarasingham, Public Policy Counsel for the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Maine and Jenna Mehnert for the National Alliance
on Mental Illness (NAMI). The ACLU of Maine testified that the group opposes
forced medication in any form, based on “fundamental civil liberties [of] . . .
autonomy and self-determination . . . .”23 The group maintained that a person never
loses “decisional capacity,” so the right to refuse treatment is never diminished. 24
The group further proposeed that a guardian should be appointed for the patient,
separate from that patient’s attorneys, to make decisions in the patient’s best
interest.25
On the other hand, NAMI, opposed the concept of allowing prosecuting
attorneys to force treatment upon a defendant under the rationale of “state interest”
because it does not comport with the goal of recovery, which should be the “guiding
principle” in mental health services.26 A process that allows the patient to accept his
or her treatment and assist in developing his or her own recovery plan is a preferable
and more effective treatment process.27
There was also public hearing testimony received in favor of the bill. However,
the testimony is largely inapplicable to certain factual scenarios that may be before
18. “The Fourteenth Amendment denies the States the power to ‘deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.’” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147 (1968) (citing U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV § 1.).
19. Hous. Amend. “A" to LD 1391 (127th Legis. 2014).
20. Comm. Amend. to LD 1391 (127th Legis. 2014) (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. 15 M.R.S.A. § 106 (2015).
23. An Act Regarding the Treatment of Forensic Patients: Hearing on LD 1391 Before the J. Standing
Comm. on Judiciary, 127th Legis. (2014) (testimony of Oamshri Amarasingham, Esq., Public Policy
Counsel for the ACLU of Maine).
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. An Act Regarding the Treatment of Forensic Patients: Hearing on LD 1391 Before the J. Standing
Comm. on Judiciary, 127th Legis. (2014) (testimony of the NAMI Maine) (explaining that “involuntarily
medicating forensic patients for the purpose of restoring competency is about prosecution.”).
27. Id.
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a Maine court. For example, the Legislature received testimony from an individual
who had worked in Maine at the Augusta Mental Health Institute, Riverview
Psychiatric Center, and the Riverview Psychiatric Recovery Center. This individual
maintained that medical treatment of psychiatric patients is “imperative” to the
recovery of patients to be returned to the community. 28 However, this testimony
ignores the reality of forensic patients who have committed crimes that make their
return to the community extremely unlikely; instead, they face a future in prison or
psychiatric centers.
Additionally, Susan Lamb, Executive Director of the Maine Chapter of the
National Association of Social Workers (NASW), testified in support of the bill. 29
However, her testimony acknowledged the NASW’s concern of a mentally ill
defendant, found incompetent to stand trial, forcibly medicated and then later moved
from a therapeutic setting of a psychiatric hospital to incarceration. 30 This actually
supports the concerns expressed during testimony of NAMI, that forced medication
undermines the goal of mental health services.
B. Federal Background
The foundation of LD 1391, which was introduced to the Legislature by Richard
Malaby of Maine House District 136, was based on two United States Supreme Court
cases: Washington v. Harper and Sell v. United States.31 In Harper, the Department
of Corrections for the State of Washington had a “Special Offender Center” to treat
and diagnose prisoners with mental disorders.32 The center had a written procedural
policy to determine the appropriateness of medication, and defendant Harper was
involuntarily treated with antipsychotic drugs following involuntary treatment
proceedings.33
Harper challenged the treatment, arguing that involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs without a judicial hearing is a violation of due
process rights.34 The Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution permits
forced medication of prison inmates with antipsychotic medication if the inmate is a
danger to himself or others, or the treatment is in the “medical interest” of the
inmate.35 The decision in Harper helped, in part, to pave the way for the later
decision of Sell.
In Sell, the defendant, formerly a practicing dentist, had a long history of mental
28. An Act Regarding the Treatment of Forensic Patients: Hearing on LD 1391 Before the J. Standing
Comm. on Judiciary, 127th Legis. (2014) (testimony of Laura Fisher, President of the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Maine).
29. An Act Regarding the Treatment of Forensic Patients: Hearing on LD 1391 Before the J. Standing
Comm. on Judiciary, 127th Legis. (2014) (testimony of Susan Lamb, Executive Director of the Maine
Chapter of the NASW).
30. Id.
31. An Act Regarding the Treatment of Forensic Patients: Hearing on LD 1391 Before the J. Standing
Comm. on Judiciary, 127th Legis. (2014) (introductory testimony of Richard Malaby, Representative of
ME House Dist. 136).
32. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 214 (1989).
33. Id. at 217.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 227 (“[G]iven the requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits
the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his
will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest.”).
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illness, but was originally found by a magistrate to be competent to stand trial for
fraud.36 The Magistrate later revoked Sell’s bail because his mental condition had
worsened, according to testimony at a bail revocation hearing, after a grand jury
returned a new indictment for a charge of tampering with a witness.37 The witness
tampering case was joined with the fraud case for trial.38 Sell was later found
incompetent to stand trial, and the magistrate authorized involuntary administration
of antipsychotic medication.39
The Supreme Court remanded for further
proceedings, but held that:
[T]he Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer
antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in
order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is
medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may
undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives,
is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests.40

In addition to Harper and Sell, other cases have laid precedent for states to rely
upon in addressing involuntary medication of defendants. For example, Riggins v.
Nevada has also set a precedent related to requirements of involuntary treatment. 41
In Riggins, prior to Sell, the United States Supreme Court held that if a defendant
refuses antipsychotic medication, the State is obligated to establish the necessity and
appropriateness of the medication, and also to address possible alternatives. 42
C. Summary
The State of Maine enacted LD 1391, “An Act Regarding the Treatment of
Forensic Patients,” [hereinafter “the Act”] in 2015. The new law allows for
involuntary medication of a defendant declared incompetent, for the sole purpose of
restoring competency to stand trial, provided certain conditions are met. The purpose
of the law is purportedly based on the need to protect hospital staff and reduce costs
of mental hospitals. However, the purpose of involuntarily medicating a pretrial
defendant to restore competency to stand trial is not based on the need to protect
hospital staff. Rather, the purpose of such involuntary medication is to fulfill
retributive functions of criminal justice – essentially, to start the process of punishing
the defendant for his crimes.43 The doctrinal support for the new law rests on
Washington v. Harper and Sell v. United States. However, the factors laid out in
Sell, which allow a state to involuntarily medicate a defendant who has been deemed
incompetent to stand trial, are exceptionally difficult in and of themselves to satisfy.
Additionally, the existing policies and procedures in Maine make the Sell factors
even less likely to be satisfied, rendering the law ultimately unnecessary for Maine.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169-70 (2003).
Id. at 170.
Id.
Id. at 171, 173.
Id. at 179.
See generally Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
Id. at 135.
The implications of this will be further discussed infra Part V, Section B.
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IV. MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
“Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body”
—Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo44
A. Mental Illness in the Federal System
It has been only relatively recently that mental disability and illness have been
taken seriously in the legal system. Mental illness was historically addressed in the
legal system by the civil commitment of an offender. For example, states utilized
the process of commitment to psychiatric centers at least as early as the middle 19th
Century, relying on principles of “parens patriae,” and later “police powers.” 45
States exercised these powers without concern for the rights of the patients. Patients
were committed for the protection of the patient and the public, because the patient
“was incapable of acting in his or her own welfare.” 46
True due process considerations concerning the commitment of patients did not
arise until about the 1970s.47 In 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided
Humphrey v. Cady, which reversed a sentence for indefinite civil commitment,
referring to such commitment as “a massive curtailment of liberty.” 48 Within the
same year, the Court created a due process requirement of “reasonable relation,” that
is, the “nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed.” 49 The Court significantly expanded
due process rights concerning commitment in 1975 in O’Connor v. Donaldson,
holding that the commitment process must abide by constitutional principles.50
Later, in In re Winship, the Court emphasized the importance of what society
considers to be fair, and what instills confidence in the criminal justice system. 51
Fortunately, after decades of just dealing with mental illness, the legal system
began to strive toward understanding mental illness. In 2002, the Supreme Court
decided the landmark case of Atkins v. Virginia. In Atkins, the Virginia Supreme
Court affirmed a conviction and sentence of a mentally disabled man, convicted of
capital murder and sentenced to death.52 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
execution of a mentally disabled individual constitutes cruel and unusual

44. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of NY Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
45. David F. Mrad, The Pre-Sell Medication Controversy: Restoring Competency at the End of the
20th Century, 37 J. Psychiatry & L. 341, 342 (2009).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 343.
48. Id. (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)).
49. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
50. Id. at 344 (quoting O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)).
51. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“It is also important in our free society that every individual going
about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal
offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.”).
52. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002).
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punishment,53 prohibited under the Eighth Amendment. 54 The Court reasoned that
the large number of states which already prohibited such execution evidenced a
broad societal view of mentally disabled “offenders as categorically less culpable
than the average criminal.”55 Mentally disabled individuals may be competent, but
also may have “diminished capacities to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in
logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand others' reactions.” 56
Execution is excessive punishment for mentally disabled criminals, due to
diminished culpability and low impulse control; therefore, execution does not serve
its primary goals of retribution and deterrence with mentally disabled offenders. 57
Most importantly, the impairments of mentally disabled offenders give such
defendants a “special risk of wrongful execution.” 58
Federal law in the United States has utilized several tests to determine the sanity
of a defendant. The traditional insanity test is called the “M’Naghten Rule.” The
Rule is based on an English criminal case in the 1800s,59 in which the defendant tried
to kill Sir Robert Peel, the Prime Minister, but mistakenly shot Sir Robert Peel’s
secretary at the Prime Minister’s home. 60 Several medical experts testified as to the
insanity of M’Naghten, as did two impartial physicians summoned to testify by the
court.61 M’Naghten was found not guilty of the crime by reason of insanity. 62 Out
of this case developed the M’Naghten Rule, used to establish insanity.
The M’Naghten Rule has three prongs. First, the accused must have some
mental illness or defect.63 Second, the mental illness or defect must deprive the
accused of the “ability to understand the nature and quality of his actions or their
wrongfulness.”64 Lastly, the accused must have suffered from the mental illness or
defect at the time of the crime.65 However, an additional prong was later added to
the traditional insanity test in most jurisdictions, called the “irresistible impulse”
test.66 In addition to the M’Naghten Rule, the “irresistible impulse” test determines
whether the defendant is entitled to acquittal, because his mental illness resulted in
an inability to control himself, and he was “overcome by an irresistible impulse to

53. Id. at 321.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
55. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304.
56. Id. at 305.
57. Id.
58. Id. (“[M]entally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution
because of the possibility that they will unwittingly confess to crimes they did not commit, their lesser
ability to give their counsel meaningful assistance, and the facts that they are typically poor witnesses and
that their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes.”).
59. Daniel M’Naughten’s Case [1843] 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (appeal taken from Scot.).
60. Marvin H. Firestone, Psychiatric Patients and Forensic Psychiatry, in LEGAL MEDICINE 621, 623
(Am. Coll. of Legal Med. ed., 7th ed. 2007).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 24 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 612.2 (3d ed. 2015).

146

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1

commit the crime.”67
Congress later adopted the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, the first
legislative act regarding the insanity defense,68 possibly as a response to growing
criticisms of the existing insanity tests. 69 The Act adopted some of the insanity test
proposed by the American Law Institute (ALI), 70 but specifically eliminated a
“volitional” requirement—or an “irresistible impulse” test—proposed by the ALI.71
The implications of this exclusion of a volitional requirement were critical—the
exclusion meant that no longer would the defendant’s inability to control himself be
exculpatory.72 The defendant must truly lack the ability to understand the “nature
and quality of his actions or their wrongfulness.” 73 The Act shifted the burden of
proof to the defendant, requiring proof of the insanity defense by “clear and
convincing evidence.”74 The Act also created the “not guilty only by reason of
insanity” verdict, which triggers automatic commitment proceedings.75 Nonetheless,
the Act is unlikely to be the end of the road in the development of the insanity
defense.76
B. Mental Illness in the State of Maine
1. History of Mental Illness in Maine
Maine has also gone through a transition in the treatment of mental illness in the
legal system. For example, beginning in 1971, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court,
sitting as the Law Court, held that a habeas corpus petitioner, found not guilty of a
felony and later involuntarily committed to a mental institution without a separate
hearing, was not denied due process or equal protection of the law. 77 In 1979, the
court held that the fact that a defendant was recently civilly committed to a mental
hospital does not, by itself, raise a reasonable doubt as to culpability without
additional evidence.78 The court later held that an “irresistible impulse,” or an
67. Id.
68. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 634, http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual634-insanity-defense-reform-act-1984 (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
69. 24 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 612.2 (3d ed. 2015) (explaining
that the DC Circuit and the ALI adopted a new insanity test in response to growing criticisms of existing
tests).
70. The ALI proposed a new insanity test, which stated: “(1) A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law. (2) As used in this article, the terms “mental disease or defect” do not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.” Id.
71. Id.
72. See Id.
73. Firestone, supra note 60.
74. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 634, http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual634-insanity-defense-reform-act-1984 (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
75. Id.
76. For example, in 2006, the Supreme Court upheld a state law narrowing the M’Naughten test for
insanity, holding that eliminating part of the federal test did not violate some “constitutional minimum.”
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 753 (2006).
77. Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 134, 138 (Me. 1971).
78. State v. Sommer, 409 A.2d 666, 669 (Me. 1979).
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“inability to control one’s actions” does not negate culpability in a criminal trial, but
it does serve as an excuse.79 Finally, in 1985, the court held that evidence with a
tendency to negate a defendant’s culpable state of mind should not be excluded when
the evidence meets requirements for admissibility noted in Flick.80
Historically, the Law Court has referred to defenses of mental disease or illness
under a catch-all term of “defense of insanity,” without distinction between the types
of defenses.81 The court has also held that a defense of insanity is an affirmative
defense,82 which requires the defendant to prove he lacked culpability by a
preponderance of the evidence.83 Recently, the court has held that a defendant may
raise both a mental abnormality defense and an insanity defense. 84 When a defendant
raises a mental abnormality defense, the burden does not shift to the defendant, but
rather remains on the prosecution to prove culpability beyond a reasonable doubt. 85
An abnormal condition of the mind of a specific character, which “substantially
affects cognitive or substantially impairs volitional processes,” may result in a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. 86 Conversely, an abnormal condition of
the mind defense may result in an acquittal if it successfully raises reasonable doubt
as to culpability.87
Common law in Maine typically prohibits a jury instruction regarding a “not
criminally responsible by reason of insanity” verdict. 88 This is largely founded in
the reasoning that Maine juries serve only a fact-finding function, and the legal
consequences of their fact-finding should be immaterial to the jury’s deliberations.89
However, other state courts are split on the issue. 90 More than twenty state
jurisdictions allow jury instructions on the consequences of an insanity verdict,
deciding that common misconceptions regarding such a verdict may prevent the jury
from finding that verdict.91 Jurors may be reluctant to find the defendant not
criminally responsible by reason of insanity because they do not want the defendant
to “go free.”92
79. State v. Mishne, 427 A.2d 450, 455 (Me. 1981).
80. State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d 623, 631 (Me. 1985) (referencing the rule decided by the Law Court
in State v. Flick, that an expert witness may not give opinions of whether the defendant acted intentionally
or knowingly during the crime, as such testimony contains “legal conclusions beyond the specialized
knowledge of the expert.” 425 A.2d 167, 171 (1981)).
81. State v. Howard, 405 A.2d 206, 211 (Me. 1979).
82. An “affirmative defense” is a defense where the defendant maintains, “even if I did it, I’m not
responsible.” 24 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 612.2 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2015).
83. State v. Burnham, 406 A.2d 889, 891-92 (Me. 1979).
84. State v. Graham, 2015 ME 35, ¶ 22, 113 A.3d 1102.
85. Id. ¶ 17 (quoting State v. Likay, 458 A.2d 427, 428 (Me. 1983)).
86. 418 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Me. 1980).
87. Id.
88. “It has long been the settled practice in our State that the function of the jury is to find the facts
and to apply the law as given by the court to the facts in reaching their verdict. Punishment, or whatever
may transpire after the verdict, is not the concern of the jury.” Christopher J. Rauscher, Note, “I Did Not
Want a Mad Dog Released” – The Results of Imperfect Ignorance: Lack of Jury Instructions Regarding
the Consequences of an Insanity Verdict in State v. Okie, 63 ME. L. REV. 593, 596 (2011) (quoting State
v. Park, 159 Me. 328, 336, 193 A.2d 1, 5 (1963)).
89. Id. at 594 (quoting State v. Okie, 2010 ME 6, ¶ 11, 987 A.2d 495).
90. Id. at 594.
91. Id. at 595.
92. Id.

148

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1

In reality, Maine is a “mandated commitment” jurisdiction. When there is a “not
guilty by reason of insanity” verdict, the defendant is mandatorily committed to the
custody of the Commissioner of Health and Human Services. 93 Under Maine law,
the patient is not eligible for release or discharge until the head of the institution
where the patient is placed states in his or her annual report to the Commissioner that
it is likely that the patient will not harm someone when released from custody. 94 If
the patient has committed a murder under Maine law, the report must also dictate
terms for supervision upon release.95 The Commissioner shall file the report with
the Superior Court of the county where the patient is committed, and the court shall
review it.96 If it appears by the report that the patient may be ready for release or
discharge, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the appropriateness of the
release or discharge.97 If release is ordered, terms for release are set by the court,
and release may be revoked if the person fails to comply with the terms. 98 If
discharge is ordered, that person still remains in custody of the Commissioner, and
the discharge is subject to annual review by the court, or by request of the
Commissioner, until the court terminates the review. 99
Lastly, it is helpful to note that Maine makes a careful distinction between
challenges to a defendant’s competency to stand trial and a defendant making an
insanity defense.100 Both types of challenges consist of “abnormal mental states,”
but they are distinct and separate issues.101 For example, a defense of insanity
concerns the mental state of the defendant only when the crime was committed. 102
If the issue proceeds to trial, the question for the factfinder is whether the defendant
was criminally responsible for committing the crime, considering his mental
condition at the time.103 Conversely, a challenge to the defendant’s competency
involves consideration of the defendant’s mental state during the prosecution prior
to and during the trial.104
The “constitutional standard” for the threshold of competence is “whether the
defendant . . . has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a ‘rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.’” 105 The process to determine the
competency of a defendant is laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 4241. 106 The process is as
follows: “(1) the motion to order a competency hearing; (2) the defendant’s
93. Id. at 598.
94. 15 M.R.S. §104-A(1) (2015).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. § 104-A(1)(A)(1), (2).
99. Id. § 104-A(1)(B).
100. 1-5 Pretrial Motions in Criminal Prosecutions § 5-8 (2015). The distinction is important because
“[t]he government denies the defendant his due process right to a fair trial when it convicts an incompetent
defendant or fails to provide adequate procedures for determining competence . . . . [T]here can be no trial
or further proceedings if the defendant is incompetent.”
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2006)).
106. Id.
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examination by experts on the issue of competence; and (3) the competency hearing
before the judge.”107
Issues of competency may be raised at any time during pretrial proceedings or
trial proceedings, and are often raised more than once during proceedings. 108 Either
the prosecution or the defense may make a motion to determine competency.109
Defense counsel may be obligated by fiduciary and professional duty to move to
determine competency, whether or not the client wishes to make the motion. 110 A
court may also decide sua sponte to hold a competency hearing to determine the
competency of the defendant at any point during proceedings.111 A court is required
to do so if there is “reasonable cause” to believe that the defendant is currently
suffering from a “mental disease or defect” which may render the defendant unable
to comprehend the proceeding against him, or assist in preparing a complete
defense.112 It is also important to note that the standard of review for “reasonable
cause” is a low threshold.113
If a court finds reasonable cause to hold a competency hearing, 18 U.S.C. §
4241(b) authorizes the court to compel an examination of the defendant, with a
written report prepared by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist. 114 During this
period of evaluation, the defendant may be ordered by the court to be temporarily
committed for a reasonable amount of time, but not longer than thirty days. 115 The
report of the facility is later delivered to the court. 116
2. Guardianship in Maine
Prior to the passage of the Act, Maine law allowed an incapacitated person in
Maine to have a guardian appointed on his or her behalf.117 The process of the
appointment of guardianship is as follows: 118 a court determines whether a person
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. It is worth noting that it is not only the responsibility of defense counsel to ensure a fair trial.
See State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 41, 58 A.3d 1032 (“A prosecutor is, however, imbued with a special
responsibility in representing the State and ‘has a responsibility to help ensure a fair trial.’”) (quoting State
v. Lockhart, 2003 ME 108, ¶ 48, 830 A.2d 433). However, this discussion is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
111. 1-5 Pretrial Motions in Criminal Prosecutions, supra note 100.
112. Id.
113. Id. Case law indicates that courts most often find reasonable cause when the court has access to
detailed information of the specific defendant, including information about the defendant’s behavior and
demeanor during the litigation and proceedings, and a detailed mental health history of the defendant. Id.
114. Id. The court may appoint more than one licensed psychiatrist or psychologist, if deemed
necessary and appropriate. Id.
115. Id. The director of the hospital or center where the defendant is committed may request an
extension of time, upon a showing of “good cause” that the facility needs more time to evaluate and
examine the defendant. Id. Extension of time must be reasonable, and may not exceed more than fifteen
days. Id.
116. Id. However, the facility’s findings, observations, and directions within the report are not binding
upon the court. Id.
117. 22 M.R.S. § 3482 (1981).
118. See MAINE’S GUARDIANSHIP/CONSERVATORSHIP: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS GUIDE,
http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/oads/aps-guardianship/guardianship.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016).
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meets the legal definition of “incapacitated,”119 which then requires appointment120
of a guardian.121 A guardian appointed by a court makes decisions on behalf of the
incapacitated person lacking decision-making capacity, also called a “ward,”122 and
may have either limited or unlimited powers. 123 A guardian may also be appointed
temporarily, possibly without a hearing, for a period of no more than six months.124
Unlimited powers allow the guardian to make decisions about the patient’s treatment
over the patient’s objections, whereas a guardian with limited powers can make
treatment decisions only if specifically authorized by guardianship papers.125 A
guardian is limited by the advanced directives for care that the patient gave when
competent, and may only contradict the directives with the approval of the court. 126
A guardian may be public or private; a public guardian is a state agency, while
a private guardianship consists of everything else. 127 Additionally, there is a
particular order of preference given to certain individuals for the appointment of
guardianship.128 Guidelines for the Riverview Psychiatric Recovery Center, where
defendant Leroy Smith III was admitted, provide that a patient has the right to
appoint representatives to make decisions on his or her behalf, whereas guardians
are authorized to make decisions without the patient’s consent. 129 There are also
119. “‘Incapacitated adult’ means any adult who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental
deficiency, physical illness or disability to the extent that the individual lacks sufficient understanding or
capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning that individual’s person, or to the
extent the adult cannot effectively manage or apply that individual’s estate to necessary ends.” 22
M.R.S.A. § 3472(10) (2015).
120. The standard of proof for a finding which approves a guardian for an incapacitated person is now
“clear and convincing,” a recent change from the “preponderance of the evidence” standard previously
utilized by the State. See In re Anthony R., 2010 ME 4, ¶¶ 10, 11, 987 A.2d 532.
121. A court may also appoint a conservator, which is an appointed individual, corporation, or agency
appointed to “protect and manage” the assets of the incapacitated person unable to manage his or her own
estate.
However,
this
is
beyond
the
scope
of
this
Comment.
MAINE’S
GUARDIANSHIP/CONSERVATORSHIP: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS GUIDE, supra note 118.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. A temporary guardian may have the same responsibilities and powers of a permanent guardian.
If the incapacitated adult ward wishes to contest the appointment, the court will hold an “expedited
hearing” within 40 days. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (The order of preference for the appointment of a guardian, as established by Maine law, is as
follows:
1. The person or organization nominated in writing by the person in need of a guardian;
2. The spouse;
3. The domestic partner;
4. An adult child;
5. A parent, including a person nominated by will or other writing signed by a deceased
parent;
6. Any relative with whom the person in need of a guardian has lived with for more than
six months prior to the filing of the petition;
7. A person nominated by someone who is caring for the incapacitated person or paying
benefits to him or her.).
129. RIVERVIEW
FULL
RIGHTS
OF
RECIPIENTS
ADULT
MANUAL,
http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/samhs/mentalhealth/rights-legal/recipients/RightsRecipients/index.shtml
(last visited Sept. 8, 2016). The responsibilities and powers of a guardian are essentially the same as a
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several other psychiatric centers in the State of Maine, in addition to the Riverview
Psychiatric Recovery Center.
3. Process of Medical Treatment in Maine
Psychiatric hospitals in Maine have a unified procedure for involuntarily
medicating psychiatric patients, which predates the Act.130 The procedure provides
that hospital patients have a right to “informed consent,” so patients with capacity
may refuse medical treatment, except in a case of “emergency.” 131 A patient may
only be involuntarily medicated under the following conditions:
•
•
•
•
•
•

a guardian for the incapacitated patient consents,
the incapacitated patient has an advance directive that allows treatment over
objection,
a District Court has ordered treatment with an involuntary commitment,
treatment is authorized following a clinical review panel,
treatment is authorized following an administrative hearing, or
a psychiatric emergency exists. 132

It is worthwhile to discuss each of these conditions in turn. First, as previously
discussed, a court may appoint a guardian to a patient as necessary. 133 Whether the
guardian is appointed limited or unlimited powers affects whether the guardian may
consent to medication of the patient; however, despite the categorization of the
guardian, the guardian may not consent to restraint of the patient to administer the
medication.134 A guardian’s power is also restricted by the patient’s health care
directive and power of attorney, and the guardian may not contradict the patient’s
instructions given at time of capacity.135
Second, an agent, power of attorney, or guardian of a patient must follow
instructions the patient gave when he retained decisional capacity. 136 These
instructions, either oral or written, may be given by the patient, either to his physician
or health care provider, or to a surrogate. 137 A surrogate is a person able to make
decisions on behalf of the patient if no guardian or agent is “reasonably available.” 138
Persons who may act as surrogates include “spouses, life partners, adult children,
[and] parents.”139
Third, a Maine District Court may order involuntary treatment of a committed

parent’s responsibilities and powers toward a minor child. For a more expansive discussion, see MAINE’S
GUARDIANSHIP/CONSERVATORSHIP: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS GUIDE, supra note 118.
130. ME. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MEDICATING PATIENTS INVOLUNTARILY AT
PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS (Dec. 31, 2013), http://maine.gov/dhhs/samhs/mentalhealth/rightslegal/involuntary/Medicating_Patients.html.
131. Id. at 1.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.

MAINE LAW REVIEW

152

[Vol. 69:1

patient.140 However, the treatment may only last up to 120 days or until the end of
the patient’s commitment, whichever may occur first, and there must be a
commitment hearing to ensure that certain guidelines are met. 141 The guidelines for
such a court order essentially follow the Sell factors:
[T]he court must find that the patient is incapacitated, the patient is unwilling or
unable to comply with recommended treatment, the need for treatment outweighs
risks and side effects, and the recommended treatment is the least intrusive
appropriate option. The court findings may also include findings that the failure to
treat the illness is likely to produce great harm to the person, or that without the
treatment, the person’s commitment will likely be significantly extended without
addressing the symptoms that pose a likelihood of serious harm. 142

Fourth, treatment may be permitted following a meeting of a Clinical Review
Panel, which is the “exclusive administrative process for authorization of involuntary
medication for civilly committed patients.” 143 To initiate a meeting of a Clinical
Review Panel, the patient’s physician must request the meeting.144 Then, the hospital
head “appoints a panel of at least two licensed professional staff,” one of which must
be licensed to prescribe medication. 145 The panel may not include any of the
patient’s direct care providers.146 During the meeting, the patient and an advocate
may be present to discuss the refusal of treatment, inform the panel or present
witnesses, and to ask questions to the panel.147 The panel is restricted to the same
Sell-like guidelines as the court order above, and the same 120-days-or-until-end-ofthe-involuntary-commitment timeline for extent of treatment as above.148
Fifth, the procedure includes “Rights of Recipients of Mental Health Services,”
which provide for an involuntary medication administrative hearing process, but is
only available for forensic patients such as Leroy Smith III. 149 This administrative
hearing process is initiated by a mental health professional, generally a psychiatrist,
recommending a specific treatment for the forensic patient. 150 If the patient refuses
or objects to the treatment, the professional determines whether the patient has
capacity to object to the treatment; if the professional determines that the patient does
not, the professional must obtain a second opinion.151 If the second opinion concurs,
the professional must notify the Disability Rights Center, often the patient’s next of
kin, an agent or advocate of the patient if the patient has one, and the hospital head. 152
Before the hearing for involuntary treatment is initiated, there must be an alternative
treatment meeting held by the professional recommending the treatment. 153 At the
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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meeting, the patient and the patient’s treatment team discuss alternative treatments
and the patient’s objections.154 If no alternative is agreed upon, either the
professional or the patient may decide whether to proceed to the administrative
hearing.155 The hospital must notify the patient of the requested hearing and his
rights, and must assist the patient in obtaining a lawyer.156 At the confidential
hearing, the hospital must show, by clear and convincing evidence, the following:
1. The patient lacks capacity to make a decision about a particular treatment;
2. The proposed treatment is based on adequately substantiated exercise of
professional judgment;
3. The benefits of the treatment outweigh the risks and the possible side-effects; and
4. The proposed treatment is the least intrusive appropriate treatment available under
the circumstances.157

After the hearing, if the hospital established the above elements, there are
restrictions on the treatment that may be ordered.158
Lastly, a patient may be forcibly treated in a period of emergency. 159 An
“emergency” situation is limited to the following:
1. As a result of a patient’s behavior due to mental illness, there exists a risk of
imminent bodily injury to the patient or to others;
2. Treatment is required immediately to ensure the physical safety of the recipient
or others;
3. Nobody legally entitled to consent on the patient’s behalf is available; and
4. A reasonable person concerned for the physical safety of the patient or others
would consent to treatment under the circumstances. 160

The decision to medicate in an emergency is serious and must not be taken
lightly. Emergency treatment cannot be ordered just because a patient refuses or
objects to treatment.161 The patient may only be treated while the emergency
persists, and must end if there is no risk of imminent bodily injury. 162 Additionally,
the professional ordering the emergency treatment must make the following
additional documentations:
•
•
•

the period (up to seventy-two hours) for which medication may be dministered,
the expected benefits of the emergency treatment order,
what behaviors and responses the staff should monitor, and

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. For example, if the patient shows that he would have refused the treatment, if he had capacity, on
religious grounds or personal beliefs, treatment will not be authorized. Further restrictions dictate that
electroconvulsive therapy may not be ordered, the hospital must wait to begin treatment at least a full day
after the order, and if the hospital wants to continue treatment after the 60-day period, it must go through
the same process as the original hearing and also notify the patient’s family or public guardian of the
possible need for guardianship. The patient may appeal the order. Id.
159. Id. at 4-5.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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how the staff should monitor the patient’s behaviors and response to treatment.163

The State of Maine has these described procedures in place to administer
treatment of patients in the state’s psychiatric hospitals. The procedures have builtin limitations and short-term restrictions on medication to deal with the issue of
safety regarding the patient. The Act expanded the existing procedure to force
treatment and medication upon a defendant in the pretrial posture for the purpose of
possibly restoring competency to stand trial, regardless of whether the defendant
poses current safety concerns to himself or others.
V. MORALITY OF INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION
“The right of a person to control his own body
is a basic societal concept,
long recognized in the common law . . . ."
—Judge Sidney M. Schreiber164
A. Deprivation of Fundamental Rights
As previously discussed, the American criminal justice system has been built
around notions of fundamental fairness in every criminal trial. These notions include
the fundamental right to a fair and accurate trial, and the fundamental right to aid in
the presentation of one’s own defense. 165 The forced medication of a pretrial
defendant is contrary to these notions of fairness because it inhibits the defendant’s
ability to communicate with his attorney in the preparation and presentation of his
own defense, and affects the way the defendant is perceived at trial. 166
Furthermore, a defendant who is under the influence of antipsychotic
medication, and thus subject to its side effects, may be (1) prejudiced by the way his
behavior in court is perceived by the fact finder, and (2) prejudiced by his own
inability to assist in the preparation of his defense before trial. 167
B. Lack of Legitimate Penological Purpose
Additionally, although the Constitution does not require laws to serve one
specific penological interest, there are four traditional legitimate goals of penal
sanctions: incapacitation, rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution. 168 Forcible
medication for the sole purpose of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial
only serves one goal – retribution.
“Incapacitation” is described as the concept that society is protected by
removing a criminal from society because that criminal cannot commit further
163. Id.
164. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (N.J. 1985).
165. Firestone, supra note 60, at 621 (“Society's sense of morality dictates that an individual who is
unable to comprehend the nature and the object of the proceedings against him or her, to confer with
counsel, and to assist in the preparation of his or her own defense may not be subjected to a criminal
trial.”).
166. See infra Part VI.
167. See infra Part V, Section B.
168. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003).
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crimes.169 “Rehabilitation” is the idea that sanctions are imposed to rehabilitate the
criminal so that he will no longer commit crimes if he is reintroduced into society. 170
“Deterrence” is typically described as the concept that penal sanctions deter that
criminal from engaging in the same conduct again. 171 Lastly, “retribution”—the
“oldest form of punishment”—is the idea that punishment is necessary to retaliate
against the defendant, get revenge for the wrong committed, and serve upon the
defendant his “just deserts.”172
A defendant such as Leroy Smith III, who is already in custody of the state as a
patient in a mental facility, is already incapacitated. Similar to a prisoner, a
defendant who is a patient at such a facility is removed from society and unable to
commit further crimes. Additionally, the patient is already in a rehabilitative
environment. The patient has around-the-clock care to meet that patient’s needs and
is in a safe environment. As for deterrence, it is unlikely that such a goal can be
readily met with a defendant like Smith. When the defendant has been deemed
incompetent to stand trial, it is unlikely that any sanction will have a deterrent effect
for that defendant, because the defendant most likely does not comprehend the
implications of the sanction. Therefore, imposing a sanction on a criminal defendant
who has been deemed incompetent, is already incapacitated, and is in a rehabilitative
environment can only serve the penological interest of retribution.
By seeking to forcibly medicate a defendant for the sole purpose of rendering
the defendant competent for trial, the State is seeking an opportunity to retaliate
against the defendant—the defendant who is presumed innocent in the pretrial stage.
The State is seeking to ignore the current incapacitation of the defendant in a
rehabilitative environment, and is instead attempting to subject the defendant to trial
for the sole purpose of retaliating against him for his crimes. This is morally
reprehensible conduct by the State. The most likely outcomes are that the defendant
is found not criminally responsible by reason of insanity at the trial, and then the
defendant will end up back in the facility he was first located in, or that the defendant
is found guilty of his crimes, and given a prison sentence that is likely to be far less
rehabilitative than treatment in a mental hospital. Some may argue that “just deserts”
require a defendant to spend adequate time receiving a punishment for his actions.
However, a defendant could actually spend more time as a patient in a mental
hospital than as an inmate in prison. 173
VI. THE SELL FACTORS
“The only part of the conduct of any one,
for which he is amenable to society,
is that which concerns others.
169. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5, Westlaw (2d ed., database updated
Oct. 2015).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 76 n.4 (2010) (explaining that a defendant who is found
not guilty by reason of insanity may be held until he is no longer mentally ill or no longer a threat to his
own safety or the safety of others; the length of time which a patient “may be held in a mental institution
is not measured by the length of a sentence that might have been imposed had he been convicted . . . .”).
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In the part which merely concerns himself,
his independence is, of right, absolute.
Over himself, over his own body and mind,
the individual is sovereign.”
—John Stuart Mill174
The factors provided by the United States Supreme Court in Sell v. United
States175 establish the constitutionality of involuntary medication to restore
competence to stand trial. However, each factor is intentionally stringent. It is
especially difficult to satisfy these requirements in the State of Maine, due to the
policies and procedures discussed above. To further illustrate this issue, each Sell
factor will be discussed in turn.
A. Whether Treatment is Medically Appropriate
“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded,
by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”
—Justice Horace Gray176
The first requirement the Supreme Court established in Sell is that the court must
determine whether the treatment of the defendant is “medically appropriate.”177
Historically, involuntary treatment with antipsychotic drugs was deemed “medically
appropriate” when used for the purpose of reducing the risk of danger to the patient
and to others.178 Typically in Maine, treatment of incapacitated patients has been
considered medically appropriate when the purpose behind the treatment is to protect
the patient from harming himself or others. 179 As such, the Law Court has
determined that personal autonomy to refuse medical treatment is “not absolute and
does not operate to prevent the State from acting to protect her from doing harm to
herself and others.”180 This was a limitation imposed on rules established in In re

174. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 17 (2011) (ebook).
175. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
176. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
177. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.
178. See generally Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 228 (1990) (holding that the state has a
“legitimate interest in treating [a prisoner] where medically appropriate for the purpose of reducing danger
he poses.”); see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (holding that the administration of
antipsychotic drugs to the defendant during trial would not have violated due process if the court had
found, among other things, that the treatment was “essential for the sake of [defendant’s] own safety or
the safety of others.”).
179. See generally Guardianship of Boyle, 674 A.2d 912 (Me. 1996) (Law Court upheld the power of
the Department of Human Services, as an appointed guardian with limited powers for the incapacitated
patient, to authorize treatment with psychotropic medication, even though patient had expressed contrary
wishes before she was determined to be incapacitated).
180. Id. at 914.
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Gardner181 and In re Swan.182 Maine in the past has determined that the law of
informed consent encompasses the right to refuse medical treatment, in part based
on the “patient’s right to be free from nonconsensual invasions of his bodily
integrity.”183 Additionally, the court has acknowledged that medication may affect
a defendant’s ability to participate in the legal process. 184
The case of Leroy Smith III will again be utilized to exemplify these principles
in practice. Smith has consistently refused treatment suggested to him by the state
forensic hospital, Riverview Psychiatric Center. 185 Miriam Davidson, a nurse
practitioner at Riverview who is assigned to Smith’s team, stated that if the
involuntary medication of Smith is approved by the court, the hospital would start
Smith on Zyprexa.186 The hospital would like a regimen of antipsychotic
medication—it is not clear whether the regimen is to consist entirely of Zyprexa, or
if other medications will be administered as well—to be ordered for a six-month time
period, with the option of early evaluation if it appears that Smith’s competency is
restored, or appears restored, earlier than expected.187 The hospital has already
administered Zyprexa to Smith, during a recent “psychiatric emergency” in
November, when Smith was “presenting a danger to others” while he resisted
hospital personnel attempting to administer his antipsychotic medication. 188
Davidson revealed that, during this episode, Smith was restrained and the medication
forcibly administered by injection.189 Davidson further explained that the medication
would first be offered to Smith as an oral dose, but if again refused, the medication
would be administered as a forcible injection.190 Current hospital policies allow such
an involuntary administration of medication until the patient is no longer considered
to be dangerous, but no longer than seventy-two hours.191
In the case of Smith, use of Zyprexa has been determined by Riverview to be
medically appropriate, at least to treat his dangerous conduct. However, it has been
used on Smith only for short periods of time, up to only seventy-two hours, as

181. 534 A.2d 947, 951 (Me. 1987) (holding that the common law doctrine of informed consent
governs the right to refuse treatment, including life-sustaining treatment, and the right of informed consent
is without significance if the right does not also include the right to informed refusal).
182. 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) (affirming the Superior Court’s order to allow discontinuance
of life-sustaining procedures, after a determination that sufficient evidence existed that patient had made
decision before the procedures were necessary that he did not want to be kept alive in a vegetative state
by life-sustaining procedures, regardless of the fact that such declarations were made before the patient
had reached the age of majority).
183. Gardner, 534 A.2d at 951.
184. In re Christopher H., 2011 ME 13, ¶ 19, 12 A.3d 64 (holding that when a court learns that an
individual who is the subject of an involuntary commitment hearing has been involuntarily medicated, “it
will suffice if the record reflects that the court asked the individual, his or her attorney, or an expert
medical witness to discuss whether and to what extent the effects of the medications involuntarily
administered to the individual interfere with the individual's ability to be present and participate in the
hearing.”).
185. Adams, supra note 2, at 6.
186. Id. at 2.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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directed by hospital policy. Treatment of a defendant awaiting trial will necessarily
be longer than seventy-two hours, because far more time is necessarily needed to
prepare the defense and go through the necessary pretrial motions and
proceedings.192 The mere fact that a certain medication has been declared
appropriate to treat the specific short-term behavior of the defendant does not mean
that the medication is appropriate to treat the long-term behavior of the defendant.
If the specified drug, in Smith’s case Zyprexa, begins to fail and is no longer
successful in treating the defendant, a different drug will most likely be administered
as part of the treatment regimen. This could mean that the defendant will now be
treated with antipsychotic medication that he has never been treated with before,
which may carry different or additional side effects. The hospital may not know how
the defendant will respond to it and what reactions it will incite from the defendant.
Additionally, Miriam Davidson, the psychiatric nurse practitioner treating
Smith, said in court that the medical treatment will not prevent Smith from
experiencing his delusions; it will only help him manage them better. 193 Davidson
also said that many people suffering from delusional disorder may never experience
a complete end to their delusions.194 Lastly, Davidson explained that delusional
disorder, which she diagnosed Smith with, does not respond to medical treatment as
well as other disorders.195 These statements further illustrate why deeming forcible
drug treatment “medically appropriate” is problematic. In addition to being unable
to know how the drugs might affect the defendant on a long-term basis, some
disorders are more difficult to treat than others. As is true for most mental health
diagnoses, the patient may never truly be rid of the effects of his disorder.
Lastly, a major concern in determining whether treatment of the defendant is
“medically appropriate” is the amount of reliance necessarily involved between the
legal and medical profession. Specifically, judges typically lack specialized medical
training.196 This poses two distinct issues. First, because a hearing concerning
whether or not to forcibly medicate a defendant necessarily includes a discussion of
which medication to treat with and the specifics of the dosage, this can involve a
court making medical decisions without medical training, essentially “practicing
medicine from the bench.”197 Perhaps even worse, a court could order medical

192. In United States District Courts, the average length of time for a homicide offense, from filing to
completion of jury trial, is 16.9 months. U.S. DISTRICT COURTS – MEDIAN TIME FROM COMMENCEMENT
TO
TERMINATION
FOR
CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS,
BY
OFFENSE,
Table
D-10,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-datatables?tn=&pn=All&t=69&m[value][month]=&y[value][year (last visited April 25, 2016).
193. Brogan, supra note 3.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Richart L. DeMier & Robert G. Sarrazin, The Sell Decision: An Argument for Judicial Restraint,
37 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 335, 336 (2009).
197. Id.; see also Hon. Jessie B. Gunther, Reflections on the Challenging Proliferation of Mental
Health Issues in the District Court and the Need for Judicial Education, 57 ME. L. REV. 541, 542 (2005).
Judge Gunther said:
Maine's courts constantly deal with litigants with mental health issues. Historically, our decisions have
relied on expert testimony addressing specific issues of responsibility, risk, and treatment. In recent years,
by my observation, court involvement in the treatment process has increased, but the availability of expert
evidence has decreased. Thus, we as judges have become the ultimate decision-makers regarding litigants'

2016]

RETRIBUTIVE MEDICATION

159

treatment of a defendant without identification of specific medication and dosage.
This would allow hospital, prison, or jail staff (wherever the defendant may be
presently located) “carte blanche to experiment with what might even be dangerous
drugs or dangerously high dosages of otherwise safe drugs and would not give
defense counsel and experts a meaningful ability to challenge the propriety of the
proposed treatment.”198
Second, if the court is conscious about avoiding the practice of bench-medicine,
it will likely heavily rely on the findings and determinations of witnesses, likely
medical personnel involved with the treatment of the patient. The problem with this
scenario is that the medical personnel who are influencing the court’s order are
unlikely to be trained in the legal profession, so they are unlikely to know the legal
consequences of their findings and determinations that they present to the court.
They are likely to focus only on how the treatment will affect the defendant, instead
of considering the entire picture of what the forcible medical treatment means for the
defendant. Neither of these possibilities are particularly encouraging for a pretrial
defendant: either a court is making an uninformed and possibly dangerous
determination of specific medication and dosage, or a medically trained health
professional is making a decision about treatment without understanding the legal
consequences of that treatment. In reality, there is no safeguard to prevent either
scenario,199 and it is hard to determine which is more threatening.

mental health treatment in both criminal and civil contexts, without supporting expert testimony. In the
face of this development, three interconnected issues arise.
Id.
198. DeMier & Sarrazin, supra note 196, at 336 (quoting United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 241
(4th Cir. 2005)). Additionally, Judge Gunther explained that the decision-making authority of judges in
Maine regarding mental health issues is problematic for three reasons. First, because judicial involvement
with mental health treatment has increased, but the availability of experts for mental health issues have
decreased, there is an issue of “whether judges should even attempt to fill the void caused by lack of expert
testimony.” Judges in Maine receive a type of “on-the-job training,” whereby after listening to enough
experts discuss mental health issues, the Judge receives a technical education of the issues. However, by
default, judges in Maine are forced to use their own training and expertise—or lack thereof—to fill the
gap. This is especially problematic because areas of the law are always changing, and relying on the
judge’s “on-the-job training” is dangerous because it does not “ensure that their education is of the highest
quality and derived from the latest data. The second issue Judge Gunther addresses is whether the
standards to “achieve competency” in the field of mental health—i.e. become an expert—should be
altered, to meet the “essential” need for experts in certain areas of the law. The third and final issue Judge
Gunther addresses is the lack of feedback for sentencing and treatment of defendants with mental health
issues, and the need for “measuring the efficacy of judicial intervention,” and determining whether
sentencing and treatment of defendants with mental health issues is working. As a solution, Judge Gunther
posits “common education” for judges in Maine. The education should include training about mental
disorders, substance abuse and mental health, the sufficiency of “alternative treatment programs and
mental health intervention,” among other issues. There should be a committee of sorts to ensure the
judicial education is updated frequently to reflect changes in the profession and in the law, the judicial
education should be made available to litigants, and judges should be familiar with which professionals
qualify as experts in given areas. Gunther, supra note 197, at 142-51.
199. DeMier & Sarrazin, supra note 196, at 336-37 (“Only a strict interpretation of Sell, however,
should lead a court to conclude that such specificity is necessary. In fact, if the goal of the proceeding is
to facilitate restoration of competency, such a conservative course could delay, if not derail, the
competency restoration process.”).
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B. Side Effects of Treatment and Fairness of Trial
“The right to one's person
may be said to be a right of complete immunity:
to be let alone”
—Judge Thomas M. Cooley200
The second Sell factor requires a court to consider the side effects of the
treatment and the fairness of trial before forcibly administering the medication. 201
Due to the significant side effects of antipsychotic medication, involuntary
medication to render a defendant competent to stand trial jeopardizes that
defendant’s right to a fair trial.202 Psychotropic drugs “deaden the patient’s ability
to think and their forced administration is an affront to basic concepts of human
dignity.”203 For example, side effects of antipsychotic medication may include
“nervous ticks, tremors, spasms, and the need to be in constant motion,” which may
occur in over half the patients treated with “conventional antipsychotic drugs.” 204
Some conditions caused by antipsychotic drugs are potentially irreversible. 205
Antipsychotic medication may also produce side effects such as weakness, dizziness,
blurred vision, and difficulty concentrating.206 Even when the drugs are properly
prescribed, all antipsychotic drugs may cause “neurological and non-neurological”
side effects.207
Common non-neurological side effects include sedation, and also:
Orthostatic hypotension, which causes fainting and falling . . . decreased libido in
both sexes and impotence in males; peripheral anticholinergic effects such as dry
mouth, constipation, urinary retention, nausea, and vomiting; central anticholinergic
effects such as agitation, disorientation, hallucinations, seizures, and coma; retinal
pigmentation which may result in blindness; agranulocytosis, a potentially fatal
blood condition; lethal cardiotoxicity; allergic dermatitis; and weight gain. Many
of these effects can be controlled by reducing dosages, adding other medicine, or
changing to a different antipsychotic drug. These side effects generally cease when
the drugs are discontinued, although chronically ill patients on maintenance doses
of antipsychotic drugs may suffer permanent side effects. 208

Clearly, there are numerous serious non-neurological side effects associated
with antipsychotic drugs. An additional problem with such side effects is the
200. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (citing Cooley on Torts (2d ed.) 29).
201. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
202. See John R. Hayes, Sell v. United States: Is Competency Enough to Forcibly Medicate a Criminal
Defendant?, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 657, 657 (2004).
203. Guardianship of Boyle, 674 A.2d 912, 918 (Me. 1996) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (citing Davis v.
Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 936 (N.D. Ohio 1980)).
204. Hayes, supra note 202, at 658 (explaining that “extrapyramidal reactions . . . have been found to
occur in fifty to seventy-five percent of patients treated with conventional antipsychotic drugs.”).
205. Id. (explaining that “tardive dyskinesia . . . a vicious form of an extrapyramidal reaction . . . is
characterized by involuntary and jerky movement of the facial and oral muscles, along with the upper and
lower extremities and trunk . . . and is potentially irreversible.”).
206. Id.
207. William P. Ziegelmueller, Sixth Amendment–Due Process on Drugs: The Implications of Forcibly
Medicating Pretrial Detainees with Antipsychotic Drugs, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 836, 838-39
(1993).
208. Id. at 839.

2016]

RETRIBUTIVE MEDICATION

161

possibility that an incapacitated defendant may be subject to a long trial-and-error
process, where different drugs are tested to see which is most suitable for that
particular defendant.
In addition to non-neurological side effects, possible neurological side effects
may include:
[D]ystonias, parkinsonian symptoms, akathisia, tardive dyskinesia [which is
involuntary movements of face and extremities], neuroleptic malignant syndrome,
and seizures. Dystonic movements involve muscle spasms in the eyes, neck, face,
tongue, and arms. Parkinsonian symptoms include muscle stiffness, stooped
posture, a mask-like face, tremors, and drooling. Akathisia is muscular discomfort
that causes restlessness and agitation. Both dystonic and parkinsonian effects occur
relatively often, although less so when Mellaril is used. Other drugs may be used to
treat the symptoms of these side effects until a patient develops a tolerance to the
antipsychotic.209

The more serious neurological side effects include seizures and the potentially
fatal side effect called neuroleptic malignant syndrome, which involves fever and a
high pulse, “muscular rigidity,” and altered mental conditions which require
immediate cessation of the drugs and medical treatment. 210
Additionally, antipsychotic drugs considered to be “atypical” come with
additional side effects as well, including extrapyramidal effects discussed above,
heart arrhythmia, seizures, cataracts, vanishing of white blood cells, and more. 211
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in Riggins v. Nevada,212 expressed
concern about antipsychotic drugs. He maintained that, absent an “extraordinary
showing by the state,” Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights would prohibit
involuntary medication for the purpose of restoring competence to stand trial, in most
cases, due to the properties of antipsychotic drugs. 213
Kennedy also suggested that, rather than having their competence restored by
involuntary medication, incompetent defendants should be civilly committed. 214
Kennedy warned against the dangers of modern-day antipsychotic medications:
If the State cannot render the defendant competent without involuntary medication,
then it must resort to civil commitment, if appropriate, unless the defendant becomes
competent through other means. If the defendant cannot be tried without his
209. Id. at 839-40.
210. Id. at 840.
211. Hayes, supra note 202, at 658-59.
212. 504 U.S. 127, 138-39 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 145. However, federal courts have not upheld indefinite commitment of a defendant, whose
likelihood of regaining competency to stand trial is unlikely, based on incompetency alone. Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 733 (1972) (citing United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372 (1969)); United States v.
Walker, 335 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F. Supp. 822 (W.D. Mo. 1970); In re
Harmon, 425 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Klein, 325 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1963); Martin v.
Settle, 192 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Mo. 1961); Royal v. Settle, 192 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. Mo. 1959)). As
Justice Blackmun notes, the holdings in these federal cases create a “reasonableness” test, which
establishes that unless there is a finding of dangerousness posed by the defendant to himself or others, a
civilly committed person can only be held for a “reasonable period of time,” that period necessary to
determine the likelihood of his regaining capacity to stand trial; if the likelihood is slim, then a civil
commitment hearing must be held or the defendant released. Id.
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behavior and demeanor being affected in this substantial way by involuntary
treatment, in my view the Constitution requires that society bear this cost in order
to preserve the integrity of the trial process. The state of our knowledge of
antipsychotic drugs and their side effects is evolving and may one day produce
effective drugs that have only minimal side effects. Until that day comes, we can
permit their use only when the State can show that involuntary treatment does not
cause alterations raising the concerns enumerated in this separate opinion.215

Kennedy further warned that antipsychotic medication can prejudice the
defendant during trial “in two principal ways: (1) by altering his demeanor in a
manner that will prejudice his reactions and presentation in the courtroom, and (2)
by rendering him unable or unwilling to assist counsel.” 216
Because jurors, and even judges, watch the defendant closely during trial, a
defendant’s demeanor, behavior, appearance, and more all combine to form an
impression on the trier of fact that may greatly impact the outcome of the trial. 217 A
state’s forced administration of antipsychotic drugs, with its potential to affect and
prejudice the defendant during trial, implicates “serious due process concerns.”218
For example, the drug administered to the defendant in Riggins, Mellaril, had a
tranquilizer effect, and included side effects of “[d]rowsiness, constipation, perhaps
lack of alertness, changes in blood pressure . . . [and] depression of the psychomotor
functions.”219
However, the effects of antipsychotic drugs depend on which drug has been
administered. Mellaril is among the least potent options for antipsychotic treatment,
along with the drug Thorazine. 220 There are extremely potent antipsychotic
medications, such as Prolixin and Haldol, which allow for smaller doses to get the
same effects.221
Antipsychotic drugs will have different effects, depending on the specific drug
administered and the defendant. However, such medications may create a
“prejudicial negative demeanor in the defendant” by making him appear “nervous
and restless” or by making him appear “so calm or sedated as to appear bored, cold,
unfeeling, and unresponsive.” 222
The potential for devastating side effects prejudices a criminal defendant by
altering his outward appearance to the trier of fact, and also influencing or altering
his ability to communicate,223 which violates the constitutional due process right to
prepare and present a complete defense.224 A defendant must be able to communicate
215. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 145 (Kennedy, F., concurring).
216. Id. at 142.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 143.
220. Ziegelmueller, supra note 207, at 838-39.
221. Id.
222. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 143 (Kennedy, F., concurring).
223. Id. at 144 (“[A] defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel is impaired when he cannot
cooperate in an active manner with his lawyer.”) (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)).
224. See generally Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (holding that rules of evidence, even
if correctly applied, may violate due process if they deprive defendant of a fair trial and right to present a
complete defense); Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (holding that a defendant has a right
to present a complete defense, regardless of the sufficiency of the state’s evidence).
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vital information to his lawyer about the case, to provide all the facts necessary to
prepare a complete defense, and help develop theories of that defense. A defendant
also has a fundamental right to communicate with the trier of fact, by testifying on
the stand, if the defendant so chooses. The United States Supreme Court has also
recognized a crucial right for a defendant to testify on his own behalf and to confront
the witnesses against him.225 By administering antipsychotic medication with the
above potential side effects, the state interferes with these rights by affecting the way
the defendant behaves in the courtroom and during pretrial proceedings.
C. Existence of Less Intrusive Alternatives
“We can identify few legitimate medical procedures
which are more intrusive
than the forcible injection of antipsychotic medication.”
—Judge Edward F. Hennessey226
Third, Sell requires that a court consider the existence of less intrusive
alternatives to forcible medication before authorizing the treatment. 227 Courts must
“exercise the least amount of judicial authority necessary to encourage defendants to
accept prescribed medication without physically forcing them to ingest the
medicine.”228 The American Psychological Association, in an amicus curiae brief
for Sell, discussed what may qualify as a “less intrusive alternative” to forced
administration of antipsychotic medication. 229 First, a court must consider non-drug
alternatives to treat the defendant, and must not resort to medication if non-drug
alternatives would be effective.230 Even though the brief acknowledged that there
may be conditions that do not lend themselves to non-drug treatment, the brief argued
that a court must not immediately order the forced medication. 231 It argued that the
court still consider the probability of success of the proposed treatment in restoring
competency, and determine whether the likelihood of success “substantially
outweighs” the possibility of negative side effects.232
The state has the burden to demonstrate that there are no less intrusive
alternatives to forced medication.233 One alternative a court could utilize before
forced medication is a court order to the defendant backed by the contempt power. 234
The United States District Court for the District of Maine explained in United States
v. Burhoe that an order to take medication issued by a court backed by contempt
power is a “less forceful exercise of judicial authority” than an order authorizing the

225. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 144-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
226. In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 52 (Mass. 1981).
227. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
228. United States v. Burhoe, 692 F.Supp.2d 137, 144 (D. Me. 2010).
229. See Mayelin Prieto-Gonzalez, Supreme Court Limits Permissible Scope of Government's Ability
to Force Medication of Mentally Ill Defendants, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 737, 738 (2003) (discussing Sell
v. United States, including the American Psychological Association’s amicus curiae brief).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Me. Dept. of Health and Human Services, supra note 130, at 2.
234. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).

164

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1

forcible medication of the defendant. 235 In the case of Burhoe, the defendant
“indicated that he will abide by a court order” and would voluntarily take his
medication.236 This means that, should the defendant be responsive to a court order
backed by contempt power, the result may be the defendant submitting to treatment
by less invasive administration, such as swallowing pills. This is preferable over the
defendant resisting treatment entirely, and forcibly medicating the defendant by
injection.
Another possible alternative, before resorting to involuntary medication, is to
mimic the process used by the military. The United States military has a different
process for defendants deemed incompetent to stand trial, including a process for
restoring competency that does not entirely consist of medication.237 The restoration
process of an incompetent service member begins with a four-month evaluation
period, during which time the staff of the Federal Medical Center where the
defendant is placed must determine whether there is “substantial probability” that the
defendant will regain capacity to stand trial.238 This process requires a thorough
investigation to allow the staff to determine whether the defendant can be restored to
capacity. The comprehensive assessment performed by the medical staff involves:
[A] physical examination and laboratory studies to rule out underlying medical
illness; individual forensic interviews; review of documents describing the
defendant's arrest; past criminal history; and review of any available past medical
and mental health records. Psychological testing is offered, although sometimes
defendants refuse to participate. Incompetent defendants are usually encouraged to
attend the weekly one-hour competency restoration group, which provides basic
education on competency issues in a small group setting.239

An accused may be required to stay for longer than four months, for a
“reasonable” time period, if the court finds it likely that the defendant will regain
capacity soon.240 If, after the four-month evaluation period and possible additional
evaluations, the defendant has still not been restored to capacity, then officials begin
to consider psychotropic medication.241 If the defendant does not accept the
medication willingly, the accused typically receives a Harper hearing.242
A Harper hearing is based on the aforementioned Washington v. Harper, where
the United States Supreme Court permitted forcible medication of an inmate who
was determined to pose a dangerous threat to himself or others.243 A Harper hearing
begins by first requiring a twenty-four hour written notice of the hearing, along with
an additional explanation of the rationale behind the proposed medical treatment. 244
235. United States v. Burhoe, 692 F. Supp. 2d 137, 144-45 (D. Me. 2010).
236. Id. at 145.
237. David M. O’Dea, Navigating the Restoration of Capacity and Civil Commitment of a Mentally
Incompetent Accused, 2013 ARMY LAW. 3 (2013).
238. Id. at 4, 5.
239. Id. at 6 (quoting Bryon L. Hermel & Hans Stelmach, Involuntary Medication Treatment for
Competency Restoration of 22 Defendants With Delusional Disorder, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW
47, 50 (2007)).
240. Id. at 6.
241. Id. at 6, 7.
242. Id. at 7.
243. Id. at 7.
244. Id. at 7, 8.
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The defendant has a right to be present at the hearing with a staff member from the
medical center, to present evidence and request witnesses, and have the staff member
question witnesses.245 At the conclusion of the hearing, a psychiatrist who is
impartial and not a part of the defendant’s treatment at the facility will determine
whether the defendant poses a danger to himself or others, and thus whether the
defendant should be involuntarily medicated. 246
D. Important Government Trial-Related Interests
“In our system of a free government, where notions of individual autonomy and
free choice are cherished, it is the individual who must have the final say in respect
to decisions regarding his medical treatment in order to insure the greatest
possible protection is accorded his autonomy and freedom from unwanted
interference with the furtherance of his own desires.”
—Judge Fritz W. Alexander247
Lastly, before authorizing the forcible administration of drugs to treat the defendant, the
court must consider whether there are important government trial-related interests at stake
with the medication of the defendant.248 It has been well established that conviction of an
incompetent defendant is a violation of due process.249 Justice Stevens, in his dissenting

opinion in Washington v. Harper, argued that the decision of the majority did not
protect, and indeed “undervalued,” the liberty interest of the defendant. 250 The
liberty to be free from unwanted antipsychotic drugs is both “physical and
intellectual,” and violation of bodily autonomy is an invasion of the dimensions of
that liberty.251 The most depraved invasion of that liberty is when the purpose of the
involuntary medication is to alter the “will and the mind of the subject,” especially
if the medication creates a substantial risk for irreparable injury or death.252 Even
after conviction of a crime, there are additional due process protections for a mentally
ill defendant subjected to involuntary medication. 253 Substantive due process
requires that involuntary medication of a prisoner with antipsychotic drugs may not
be administered for any purposes, besides treatment of the prisoner within the
prisoner’s best medical interests.254
In the type of case at issue, where the State is attempting to force medication for
the sole purpose of restoring competency of the defendant to stand trial, there can be
no overriding important government interest. Safety of one’s self and safety of
others has been determined to be an important government interest, which justifies
245. Id. at 8.
246. Id.
247. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986).
248. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
249. Ziegelmueller, supra note 207, at 845.
250. 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A competent individual’s right to refuse
psychotropic medication is a fundamental liberty interest requiring the highest order of protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 237-38.
253. Id. at 242.
254. Id.
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involuntary medication in the State of Maine.255 However, at issue is whether
retribution—punishment of the defendant—is an important enough interest for the
government to justify the displacement of a defendant’s fundamental right to privacy
of one’s self and the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.
In the case of Leroy Smith III, Smith is already incapacitated at the Riverview
hospital, and is already located in a rehabilitative environment. Under current
policies already in place without the involvement of the new Maine law, Smith has
already been forcibly medicated when he has posed a threat to himself or others.
Therefore, there are already medication procedures in place that conform to the
important government interest of the safety of the patient and the safety of others.
The State is seeking to create important trial-related interests, by forcing the
necessary conditions to allow the trial to actually take place. However, this is only
serving the desire to further punish the defendant, as the defendant is already being
subjected to penological interests by remaining in the hospital. 256
VII. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the case of Leroy Smith III is no longer the only instance of
forcible medication of a Maine pretrial defendant to restore competence to stand
trial.257 In March 2016, Kennebec County Superior Court again authorized forcible
medication of a defendant who suffers from schizophrenia, antisocial personality
disorder, and substance abuse issues.258 While the case of Leroy Smith III was not
appealed, the case of Ismail Awad was.259 The Law Court heard oral arguments from
the State and the ACLU of Maine, but has not yet rendered a decision regarding the
forcible medication of Awad.260 Of note, however, is the explicit indication of Chief
Justice Saufley that she has “lingering concerns” over the forcible medication
order.261
Even though Sell established the constitutionality of forcible medication of a
pretrial defendant262 as the federal standard, every conscientious Maine court should
have lingering concerns. It is difficult to strike a careful Sell balance in federal court
– but in Maine state court, not only is it difficult, it is also unwarranted. Maine’s
255. State v. Patterson, 582 A.2d 1204, 1206 (Me. 1990).
256. The Court alluded to this idea in Sell, by stating that “prolonged confinement due to a failure to
take drugs, either before or after the competency hearing, ‘may lessen’ the significance of the
government’s interest.” Christopher Slobogin, The Supreme Court’s Recent Criminal Mental Health
Cases: Rulings of Questionable Competence, 22-FALL CRIM. JUST. 8, 9 (2007) (quoting Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166, 186 (2003)). The Court also indicated that, on remand, the lower court should
consider the fact that the defendant had already been detained for a long time. Id. Because it remanded
the case for further proceedings, the Supreme Court did not decide whether it thought the charges against
Sell were "important" enough to justify involuntary medication in his case, but at least provided some
guidance on the government interest prong. Id.
257. Edward Murphy, State’s High Court Hears Arguments on Forcibly Medicating Crime Suspect,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.pressherald.com/2016/10/26/states-high-courthears-arguments-on-forcibly-medicating-crime-suspect/.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. 539 U.S. 166, 186 (2003); see supra Part VI.
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psychiatric centers and hospitals, such as the Riverview Psychiatric Center which
houses defendant Smith, already had a unified treatment system in place before the
Act.263 The system already allowed for short-term, forcible treatment of patients who
exhibit dangerous behaviors, so as to minimize and control present risk but in a
manner limited by necessity.264
The application of the new Maine law was an attempt to fill a void that Maine
does not have. As a result, forensic patients and pretrial defendants like Smith will
face a long road of intrusive, damaging, forcible treatment of antipsychotic
medications, for potentially indefinite periods of time. The government interest
involved—retribution; punishment for crimes allegedly committed—is insufficient
to excuse the trampling of personal liberties and due process rights of pretrial
defendants, who remain innocent until proven guilty.

263. See supra Part IV.
264. Id.

